It reveals that the nuclear option was discounted because of terrain considerations that were unique to South Vietnam, which would have reduced the effectiveness of tactical nuclear weapons. As a result, "B-52 Arc Light strikes originating in Guam, Okinawa, and Thailand bombed the jungles surrounding Khe Sanh into stubble fields" and Khe Sanh became the major news headline coming out of Vietnam in late March 1968.
The Vietnam War: 11 Major Battles - warhistoryonline The launching of the largest enemy offensive thus far in the conflict did not shift Westmoreland's focus away from Khe Sanh. A smaller slice of the action saw Americans on the receiving end, defending some firebase or outpost. Upon closer analysis, the official figure does not accurately portray even what it purports to represent. The advance would be supported by 102 pieces of artillery. Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, pp. [95], It still came as a shock to the Special Forces troopers at Lang Vei when 12 tanks attacked their camp. Besieged, Khe Sanh could only be resupplied by air. The opportunity to engage and destroy a formerly elusive enemy that was moving toward a fixed position promised a victory of unprecedented proportions. After a ten-day battle, the attackers were pushed back into Cambodia. If that failed, and it did, they hoped to attack American reinforcements along Route 9 between Khe Sanh and Laos. Its main objectives were to inflict casualties on US troops and to isolate them in the remote border regions. By early 1967, the Marine position was reinforced to regimental strength. . The main US forces defending Khe Sanh Combat Base (KSCB) were two regiments of the United States Marine Corps supported by elements from the United States Army and the United States Air Force (USAF), as well as a small number of Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) troops. "[73], Nevertheless, ultimately the nuclear option was discounted by military planners. Soon after, another shell hit a cache of tear gas, which saturated the entire area. [31] Mortar rounds, artillery shells, and 122mm rockets fell randomly but incessantly upon the base. According to Gordon Rottman, even the North Vietnamese official history, Victory in Vietnam, is largely silent on the issue. In the coming days, a campaign headquarters was established around Sap Lit. Name State Date War Branch; 1: Steven Glenn Abbott . [152] The Marines occupied Hill 950 overlooking the Khe Sanh plateau from 1966 until September 1969 when control was handed to the Army who used the position as a SOG operations and support base until it was overrun by the PAVN in June 1971. [131], Planning for the overland relief of Khe Sanh had begun as early as 25 January 1968, when Westmoreland ordered General John J. Tolson, commander, First Cavalry Division, to prepare a contingency plan. All of the attacks were conducted by regimental-size PAVN/VC units, but unlike most of the previous usual hit-and-run tactics, they were sustained and bloody affairs. [56], At positions west of Hill 881 South and north of Co Roc Ridge (163340N 1063755E / 16.561N 106.632E / 16.561; 106.632), across the border in Laos, the PAVN established artillery, rocket, and mortar positions from which to launch attacks by fire on the base and to support its ground operations. [24], The plateau camp was permanently manned by the US Marines in 1967, when they established an outpost next to the airstrip. Whether they produced battlefield images of the dead or daguerreotype portraits of common soldiers, []. [108] The most dramatic supply delivery system used at Khe Sanh was the Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System, in which palletized supplies were pulled out of the cargo bay of a low-flying transport aircraft by means of an attached parachute. newsletter for the best of the past, delivered every Monday and Thursday. The Armys 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), with more than 400 helicopters under its control, conducted airmobile operations deeper into enemy-controlled areas. Operation Pegasus, begun the day after Scotland ended, lasted until April 15. Five more attacks against their sector were launched during March. For most of the battle, low-lying clouds and fog enclosed the area from early morning until around noon, and poor visibility severely hampered aerial resupply. The battalion was assaulted on the night of 23 January by three PAVN battalions supported by seven tanks. He has published over 20 books including: How to Survive Anything, Anywhere. [111] The base could also depend on fire support from US Army 175-mm guns located at Camp Carroll, east of Khe Sanh. [126], On 30 March, Bravo Company, 26th Marines, launched an attack toward the location of the ambush that had claimed so many of their comrades on 25 February. [32], Westmoreland responded by launching Operation Neutralize, an aerial and naval bombardment campaign designed to break the siege. [86] The command and control arrangement then in place in Southeast Asia went against Air Force doctrine, which was predicated on the single air manager concept. There are still debates about the true number of casualties, but estimates range that 1,000 to 3,500 US soldiers died, and a secret report from the US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam,. [36], Things remained quiet in the Khe Sanh area through 1966. Additionally, the logistical effort required to support the base once it was isolated demanded the implementation of other tactical innovations to keep the Marines supplied. On July 10, Pfc Robert Hernandez of Company A, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, was manning an M-60 machine gun position when it took a direct hit from NVA mortars. The village of Khe Sanh was the seat of government of Hng Hoa district, an area of Bru Montagnard villages and coffee plantations about 7 miles (11km) from the Laotian frontier on Route 9, the northernmost transverse road in South Vietnam. For a succinct overview of the creation of the CIDG program and its operations. The platoon withdrew following a three-hour battle that left six Marines dead, 24 missing, and one taken prisoner. Enemy artillery rounds slammed into the runway. The 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment (2/1 Marines) and the 2/3 Marines would launch a ground assault from Ca Lu Combat Base (16km east of Khe Sanh) and head west on Route 9 while the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Brigades of the 1st Cavalry Division, would air-assault key terrain features along Route 9 to establish fire support bases and cover the Marine advance. [62], On 20 January, La Thanh Ton, a PAVN lieutenant from the 325th Division, defected and laid out the plans for an entire series of PAVN attacks. The official, public estimate of 10,000 to 15,000 North Vietnamese KIA stands in contrast to another estimate made by the American military. Battle of Khe Sanh (21 January - 9 April 1968) Max Hastings wrote a bestseller on Vietnam, and Dan met him to discuss Domino theory, whether it was possible for the US to win the war and the effect the war had on those who fought in it. Ray Stubbe has published a translation of the North Vietnamese history of the siege at Khe Sanh. [165], Another interpretation was that the North Vietnamese were planning to work both ends against the middle, a strategy that has come to be known as the Option Play. The NVAs main command post was located in Laos, at Sar Lit. PAVN forces were driven out of the area around Khe Sanh after suffering 940 casualties. Early in the war US forces had established a garrison at Khe Sanh in Quang Tri province, in the . MN: 05-12-1968: Vietnam: Army: 2: Sunday marked the 50th anniversary of the start of the war's most famous siege, a 77-day struggle for a rain-swept plateau in central Vietnam that riveted the U.S. in 1968, and opened a year of . The American military presence at Khe Sanh consisted not only of the Marine Corps Khe Sanh Combat Base, but also Forward Operating Base 3, U.S. Army (FOB-3). Both sides suffered major casualties with both claiming victory of their own. The most comprehensive and authoritative history site on the Internet. On June 28, a Communist spokesman claimed the Americans had been forced to retreat and that Khe Sanh was the gravest tactical and strategic defeat for the U.S. in the war. Reinforcements from the ARVN 256th Regional Force (RF) company were dispatched aboard nine UH-1 helicopters of the 282nd Assault Helicopter Company, but they were landed near the abandoned French fort/former FOB-3 which was occupied by the PAVN who killed many of the RF troops and 4 Americans, including Lieutenant colonel Joseph Seymoe the deputy adviser for Quang Tri Province and forcing the remaining helicopters to abandon the mission. [33] Troops of the US 1st Infantry Division were able to respond quickly. Dien Bien Phu would loom large for the rest of the war, especially during the Battle of Khe Sanh. On April 15, Operation Pegasus ended and Operation Scotland II began. A victory for the Americans and South Vietnamese, the Battle of Dak To cost 376 US killed, 1,441 US wounded, and 79 ARVN killed. Fighting around Khe Sanh was continuous. This caused problems for the Marine command, which possessed its own aviation squadrons that operated under their own close air support doctrine. The PAVN claim that during the entire battle they "eliminated" 17,000 enemy troops, including 13,000 Americans and destroyed 480 aircraft. The 26th Marine Regiment (26th Marines) is an inactivated infantry regiment of the United States Marine Corps. An airborne battlefield command and control center aboard a C-130 aircraft, directed incoming strike aircraft to forward air control (FAC) spotter planes, which, in turn directed them to targets either located by themselves or radioed in by ground units. The PAVN infantry, though bracketed by artillery fire, still managed to penetrate the perimeter of the defenses and were only driven back after severe close-quarters combat. With a view to gain the eventual approval for an advance through Laos to interdict the Ho Chi Minh Trail, he determined that "it was absolutely essential to hold the base." [69] The Marine Direct Air Support Center (DASC), located at KSCB, was responsible for the coordination of air strikes with artillery fire. [51] Other concerns raised included the assertion that the real danger to I Corps was from a direct threat to Qung Tr City and other urban areas, a defense would be pointless as a threat to infiltration since PAVN troops could easily bypass Khe Sanh, the base was too isolated, and the Marines "had neither the helicopter resources, the troops, nor the logistical bases for such operations."
Air Power in the Siege of Khe Sanh - HistoryNet Indeed, had enemy forces not been at Khe Sanh, they could have joined the NVA and VC who occupied Hue, a much more important strategic target. While suffering less significant casualties (around 10,000 dead), ARVN units had only turned back the attacking PAVN forces with massive American air support.
Vietnam 40 years later: 101st Airborne Division veteran recalls Ripcord Ten American soldiers were killed; the rest managed to escape down Route 9 to Khe Sanh. Of the 4953 Navy and Air Force casualties, both officer and enlisted, 4, 736 or 96% were white. The Battle of Khe Sanh (21 January 9 July 1968) was conducted in the Khe Sanh area of northwestern Qung Tr Province, Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), during the Vietnam War. On 19 June 1968, the evacuation and destruction of KSCB began. Senior Marine Corps General Victor Krulak agreed, noting on May 13 that the Marines had defeated the North Vietnamese and won the battle of Khe Sanh. Over time, these KIA figures have been accepted by historians. That appraisal was later altered when the PAVN was found to be moving major forces into the area. [54] In attempting to determine PAVN intentions Marine intelligence confirmed that, within a period of just over a week, the 325th Division had moved into the vicinity of the base and two more divisions were within supporting distance. In March 1968, an overland relief expedition (Operation Pegasus) was launched by a combined MarineArmy/ARVN task force that eventually broke through to the Marines at Khe Sanh. Construction on the line was ultimately abandoned and resources were later diverted towards implementing a more mobile strategy. [125] On the night of 28 February, the combat base unleashed artillery and airstrikes on possible PAVN staging areas and routes of advance. Taking place between March and July 1970, the Battle of Fire. On 18 January, Westmoreland passed his request for Air Force control up the chain of command to CINCPAC in Honolulu. [30], In early October, the PAVN had intensified battalion-sized ground probes and sustained artillery fire against Con Thien, a hilltop stronghold in the center of the Marines' defensive line south of the DMZ, in northern Qung Tr Province. Sporadic actions were taken in the vicinity during the late summer and early fall, the most serious of which was the ambush of a supply convoy on Route 9. Once the aircraft touched down, it became the target of any number of PAVN artillery or mortar crews. [128] Also, Marine Lieutenant General Victor Krulak seconded the notion that there was never a serious intention to take the base by arguing that neither the water supply nor the telephone land lines were ever cut by the PAVN. The Marines, fearing an ambush, did not attempt a relief, and after heavy fighting the camp was overrun. Click to View Online Archive The Battle of Khe Sanh was conducted northwestern Quaag Tri Province, South Vietnam, between January 21 and July 9, 1968 during the Vietnam War.
Khe Sanh - Location, Vietnam War & Who Won - HISTORY Find many great new & used options and get the best deals for The Hill Fights: The First Battle of Khe Sanh by Murphy, Edward F. (mass_market) at the best online prices at eBay! "[149], While KSCB was abandoned, the Marines continued to patrol the Khe Sanh plateau, including reoccupying the area with ARVN forces from 519 October 1968 with minimal opposition. [94] Although the PAVN was known to possess two armored regiments, it had not yet fielded an armored unit in South Vietnam, and besides, the Americans considered it impossible for them to get one down to Khe Sanh without it being spotted by aerial reconnaissance. At around 10:00, the fire ignited a large quantity of explosives, rocking the base with another series of detonations. According to the official PAVN history, by December 1967 the North Vietnamese had in place, or within supporting distance: the 304th, 320th, 324th and 325th Infantry Divisions, the independent 270th infantry Regiment; five artillery regiments (the 16th, 45th, 84th, 204th, and 675th); three AAA regiments (the 208th, 214th, and 228th); four tank companies; one engineer regiment plus one independent engineer battalion; one signal battalion; and a number of local force units.
How many white soldiers died in Vietnam? - 2023 [100][Note 6], Lownds infuriated the Special Forces personnel even further when the indigenous survivors of Lang Vei, their families, civilian refugees from the area, and Laotian survivors from the camp at Ban Houei Sane arrived at the gate of KSCB. [153][154] The gradual withdrawal of US forces began during 1969 and the adoption of Vietnamization meant that, by 1969, "although limited tactical offensives abounded, US military participation in the war would soon be relegated to a defensive stance. The official assessment of the North Vietnamese Army dead is just over 1,600 killed, with two . The United States and its South Vietnamese allies pulled many huge offensive .
The Tet Offensive - Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund [157], Commencing in 1966, the US had attempted to establish a barrier system across the DMZ to prevent infiltration by North Vietnamese troops. That afternoon, as a rescue force was dispatched to the village, Army Lt. Col. Joseph Seymoe and other soldiers died when their helicopter was attacked. To support the Marine base, a massive aerial bombardment campaign (Operation Niagara) was launched by the USAF. Since the Marines on board were not yet officially attached to the 26th Marine Regiment, their deaths were not included in the official Khe Sanh count, nor were the several other deaths associated with aircraft crashes. Khe Sanh is a village located near the Laotian border and just south of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that separated North and South Vietnam. Army deaths at FOB-3, however, were not included in the official statistics either. [23][Note 2], James Marino wrote that in 1964, General William Westmoreland, the US commander in Vietnam, had determined, "Khe Sanh could serve as a patrol base blocking enemy infiltration from Laos; a base for operations to harass the enemy in Laos; an airstrip for reconnaissance to survey the Ho Chi Minh Trail; a western anchor for the defenses south of the DMZ; and an eventual jumping-off point for ground operations to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail. However, North Vietnamese sources claim that the Americans did not win a victory at Khe Sanh but were forced to retreat to avoid destruction.
50 Years Ago, US Troops Fought the Battle of Khe Sanh - Business Insider [22] The camp then became a Special Forces outpost of the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups, which were to keep watch on PAVN infiltration along the border and to protect the local population.
The Hill Fights - Wikipedia He believed that was proved by the PAVN's actions during Tet. [42], In the wake of the hill fights, a lull in PAVN activity occurred around Khe Sanh. [12] With the abandonment of the base, according to Thomas Ricks, "Khe Sanh became etched in the minds of many Americans as a symbol of the pointless sacrifice and muddled tactics that permeated a doomed U.S. war effort in Vietnam". According to Ray Stubbe, a U.S. Navy chaplain during the siege and since then the most significant Khe Sanh historian, the 205 figure is taken only from the records of the 26th Marine Regiment. U.S. Marines and their allies killed thousands of NVA, but to solve the riddle of Khe Sanh, you have to recount the numbers. Things heated up for the air cavalrymen on 6 April, when the 3rd Brigade encountered a PAVN blocking force and fought a day-long engagement. For them, the battle started when the North Vietnamese attacks began in January. [78], Thus began what was described by John Morocco as "the most concentrated application of aerial firepower in the history of warfare". [1], The evacuation of Khe Sanh began on 19 June 1968 as Operation Charlie. [166] This view was supported by a captured North Vietnamese study of the battle in 1974 that stated that the PAVN would have taken Khe Sanh if it could have done so, but there was a limit to the price that it would pay.
Airpower at Khe Sanh | Air & Space Forces Magazine - Air Force Magazine [120], On 23 February, KSCB received its worst bombardment of the entire battle. Setting out from Ca Lu, 10 miles east of Khe Sanh, Pegasus opened the highway, linked up with the Marines at Khe Sanh, and engaged NVA in the surrounding area. On April 5, 1968, MACV prepared an Analysis of the Khe Sanh Battle for General Westmoreland. "[155], According to military historian Ronald Spector, to reasonably record the fighting at Khe Sanh as an American victory is impossible. [34] The heaviest action took place near Dak To, in the Central Highlands province of Kon Tum. [140] Total US casualties during the operation were 92 killed, 667 wounded, and five missing. If firepower determined the outcome of the fight, it was airlift that allowed the defenders to hold their positions. During one 8-hour period, the base was rocked by 1,307 rounds, most of which came from 130-mm (used for the first time on the battlefield) and 152-mm artillery pieces located in Laos. Whether the destruction of one battalion could have been the goal of two to four PAVN divisions was debatable. [59], Making matters worse for the defenders, any aircraft that braved the weather and attempted to land was subject to PAVN antiaircraft fire on its way in for a landing. Armies and Commanders Allies General William Westmoreland Colonel David Lownds Approx. [156] Correspondent Michael Herr reported on the battle, and his account would inspire the surreal "Do Long Bridge" scene in the film Apocalypse Now, which emphasized the anarchy of the war. Siege at Khe Sanh: ~17,200 (304th and 308th Division), Defense at Route 9: ~16,900 (320th and 324th Division), This page was last edited on 1 March 2023, at 15:52. [148], Regardless, the PAVN had gained control of a strategically important area, and its lines of communication extended further into South Vietnam. 216217. by John Prados. At 21:30, the attack came on, but it was stifled by the small arms of the Rangers, who were supported by thousands of artillery rounds and air strikes. According to this history, originally classified as secret, the battle deaths for all major NVA units participating in the entire Highway 9Khe Sanh Front from January 20 until July 20, 1968, totaled 2,469. [123][124], Nevertheless, the same day that the trenches were detected, 25 February, 3rd Platoon from Bravo Company 1st Battalion, 26th Marines was ambushed on a short patrol outside the base's perimeter to test the PAVN strength. [138], On the following day, the 2nd Brigade captured the old French fort near Khe Sanh village after a three-day battle. [164] He cited the fact that it would have taken longer to dislodge the North Vietnamese at Hue if the PAVN had committed the three divisions at Khe Sanh to the battle there instead of dividing its forces. At the same time, the 304th Division withdrew to the southwest. It is difficult to support the claim of an overwhelming American victory at Khe Sanh based solely on the ratios derived from the official casualty count. [55] They were supported logistically from the nearby Ho Chi Minh Trail. Battle of Hamburger Hill The 29 th North Vietnam Army had entrenched themselves on Hamburger Hill in South Vietnam; a joint US-South Vietnamese force was ordered to remove them. Many of the artillery and mortar rounds stored in the dump were thrown into the air and detonated on impact within the base. [77] When weather conditions precluded FAC-directed strikes, the bombers were directed to their targets by either a Marine AN/TPQ-10 radar installation at KSCB or by Air Force Combat Skyspot MSQ-77 stations. Consequently, and unknown at the time, Operation Scotland became the starting point of the Battle of Khe Sanh in terms of Marine casualty reporting. This base was to serve as the western anchor of Marine Corps forces, which had tactical responsibility for the five northernmost provinces of South Vietnam known as I Corps. [96], The Marines at Khe Sanh had a plan in place for providing a ground relief force in just such a contingency, but Lownds, fearing a PAVN ambush, refused to implement it. The PAVN claimed that Khe Sanh was "a stinging defeat from both the military and political points of view." The Marines, whose aircraft and doctrine were integral to their operations, were under no such centralized control. The Khe Sanh battlefield was considerably more extensive from the North Vietnamese perspective than from that of the U.S. Marine Corps, both geographically and chronologically. [74], During January, the recently installed electronic sensors of Operation Muscle Shoals (later renamed "Igloo White"), which were undergoing test and evaluation in southeastern Laos, were alerted by a flurry of PAVN activity along the Ho Chi Minh Trail opposite the northwestern corner of South Vietnam. [128] They also reported 1,436 wounded before mid-March, of which 484 men returned to their units, while 396 were sent up the Ho Chi Minh Trail to hospitals in the north. A secret memorandum reported by US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, sent to US President Lyndon B. Johnson on 19 February 1968, was declassified in 2005. [47][Note 3] Westmoreland regarded the choice as quite simple. The presence of the PAVN 1st Division prompted a 22-day battle there and had some of the most intense close-quarters fighting of the entire conflict. But Pisor also pointed out that 205 is a completely false number. One had to meet certain criteria before being officially considered KIA at Khe Sanh. Unlike the Marines killed in the same place in January, since Operation Scotland had ended, the four Lima Company Marines who died in this attack on Hill 881 North were excluded from the official statistics. No logic was apparent to them behind the sustained PAVN/VC offensives other than to inflict casualties on the allied forces.